Only humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans have demonstrated that they recognize their reflections in mirrors. Other mammals (including over a dozen species of monkeys) have failed to show signs of self-recognition. Recent investigations have attempted to discover if the absence of self-recognition is related to a general inability to process mirrored information. This article describes the failure to find self-recognition in two adult Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) along with their spontaneous use of mirrored information to locate otherwise hidden food. Ss responded appropriately on Trial 1 to novel placements of food items, but continued to respond to their images as if confronted by another elephant. Results are discussed in the context of the relationship (or lack thereof) between different types of mirror-mediated behavior and selfrecognition. It is concluded that possession of mirror-mediated abilities is not a sufficient condition for the development of self-recognition.
Recently, it has been suggested that the reason monkeys fail to touch marks on their heads that are only visible in mirrors (Gallup's, 1970 , formal test of self-recognition) may be related to their inability to locate novel placements of food items that are visible only with the aid of mirrors (Menzel, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Lawson, 1985) . Chimpanzees, on the other hand, are capable of even more complex forms of visually displaced reaching efforts involving inverted television images of their arms (Menzel et al., 1985) . The apparent differences between rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees on mirror-guided reaching tasks led Menzel et al. to suggest that the self-recognition controversy would be best resolved by attributing the lack of self-recognition in monkeys, lesser apes, and gorillas to "specific mechanisms" such as perceptualmotor skills, as opposed to "taking sides on debates as to whether animal behavior is best studied by a cognitive rather than a noncognitive approach" (p. 216).
In the wake of this suggestion, Anderson (1986) recently reported that two of his macaques spontaneously developed the capacity to use mirrors to locate objects on tasks that allowed the animals to reach for hidden food rewards that were only visible in a mirror. Nonetheless, as Anderson pointed out, there was no direct evidence that they were using the mirror to help them actually guide their reaching efforts. Itakura (1987) has reported what would seem to qualify as the first demonstration that monkeys (Macaca fuscata) are capable of guiding their reaching efforts in mirrors. However, his monkeys required extensive prior training, distancing his results from the self-recognition debate, in which the relevant questions should focus on the spontaneous emergence of mirror-guided behaviors (Gallup, 1982; Menzel et al., 1985; Povinelli, 1987 ; but see Epstein, Lanza, & Skinner, 1981) .
Contrary to Menzel et al.'s (1985) reservations about the cognitive implications of self-recognition research, Gallup has proposed that the presence of self-awareness in chimpanzees and orangutans ought to be correlated with convincing demonstrations of behaviors involving the attribution of intent 122 and responsibility, intentional deception, and empathy (Gallup, 1982 (Gallup, , 1985 . In short, self-aware organisms ought to possess the ability to use their own experiences to model the experiences of others. One way of testing this model is to determine if chimpanzees and orangutans differ from other primates in their ability to pass rigorous experimental tests explicitly designed to demonstrate such capacities. Another approach is to predict, on the basis of the apparent display of a wide range of such "intentional" behaviors, other organisms that might pass objective tests of self-recognition. Elephants and dolphins stand out as likely candidates, and Gallup (1985) has urged for tests of self-recognition in these animals. Given the naturally curious demeanor of elephants, the remarkable dexterity of their trunks for use in inspecting their environment and themselves (Burger, 1965; Sikes, 1971 ; see Poole, 1987 , for a description of forehead-touching behavior in the context of musth), and their reputed intelligence, an explicit test of Gallup's prediction that these animals ought to be capable of self-recognition was undertaken.
Experimental investigations of elephant intelligence are extremely limited (Markowitz, Schmidt, Nadal, & Squier, 1975; Rensch, 1957) , although more general descriptions of their problem-solving abilities, capacity to learn, perform, and remember complicated tasks even after long time lapses, tool use and manufacture, and even artistic abilities are widely available (Blond, 1962; Burger, 1965; Gordon, 1966; Grzimek, 1970; Gucwa&Ehmann, 1985; E. Hall, 1983; Wemmer & Mishra, 1982; Williams, 1950) . There are also remarkable, although anecdotal, reports of reciprocal altruism, deception, and empathy and of intriguing responses to the bodies and skeletal remains of dead conspecifics (Douglas-Hamilton & Douglas-Hamilton, 1975; G. Hall, 1982; Moss, 1975 Moss, , 1988 Morris, 1986; Romanes, 1882) .
In this study I report the failure to discover evidence of selfrecognition in two Asian elephants. However, both subjects developed sophisticated mirror-mediated reaching behaviors without explicit training. These results are discussed in the context of their apparent inability to recognize themselves. Finally, I evaluate the claim that most animals may fail selfrecognition tasks because of their inability to cope with the perceptual-motor problems posed by mirror-guided reaching behavior.
Method

Subjects and Housing
The subjects were two female wild-born Asian elephants (Elephas maximus), Shanthi (age 12 years) and Ambika (age 39 years), housed together for 9 years at the National Zoological Park in Washington, D.C. Their enclosure consisted of two adjoining cages (connected by a sliding metal door) and periodic access to a large outdoor arena. The floor of both enclosures was approximately >/2 m above the level of the main floor. Both animals had been reared with other elephants and showed little evidence of highly stereotyped behaviors. As far as could be determined, neither animal had any prior exposure to mirrors or formal experimental learning tasks, although both had been trained to perform a variety of tricks such as sitting, kneeling, trunk raising, and moving logs.
Experiment 1
A 105 x 241 cm Plexiglas mirror was mounted on a plywood stand and placed just outside trunk's reach in a buffer zone between the elephant enclosure and the public viewing area. Two positions, one in front of each enclosure, were chosen for the mirror locations. This was necessary because, depending on factors such as cage cleaning and repair, the elephants were often restricted to one of the two enclosures. The mirror was slightly closer to the elephants on the left side (about 2.5 m from the enclosure) than on the right side (about 3.5 m). For the first few days of the experiment, each time the mirror was moved, the experimenter (and generally one of the keepers as well) climbed into the enclosure and visually checked that the subjects' reflections would be visible from the height of the elephants' eyes. In this fashion, it was possible to know reliably from where the animals were standing whether they could see their own reflections.
For the first 2 days, the mirror was mounted vertically and perpendicular to the ground. In addition, the mirror was mounted so that it extended about % m off the top of the stand and was therefore high enough for the animals to see their entire bodies. However, the animals had to be standing almost directly in front of the mirror to see themselves. On the 3rd day, the mirror mounting was changed to a horizontal and angled position (see Figure 1 ). This reduced the vertical area the animals could see of themselves to about the upper half to third of their body (depending upon how deep in the enclosure they stood). It also meant that from the back third of the enclosure they were not visible at all. However, they spent most of their time in the front half of the cage, and this position of the mirror allowed both elephants to be visible at the same time (as well as a considerable portion of the rest of the enclosure). It was hoped this would facilitate the onset of self-recognition by allowing the elephants to see each other directly and in the mirror (see Benhar, Carlton, & Samuel, 1975; Gallup, Wallnau, & Suarez, 1980) . The mirror was available 24 hr a day.
A focal animal sampling method was used to observe each animal for three 15-min sessions each morning. A modified frequency scoring system was used that recorded all behaviors in 15-s intervals. The order of observation was determined randomly, and all data were collected between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. before the zoo opened for visitors.
On the 3rd day a sham marking procedure was introduced in which each animal was wiped in five spots: a region above the eye on the forehead, a large portion of the ear, the side of the head, and an area on their foot. (The foot was marked in an attempt to provide a control mark that was directly visible to the animal. However, it was impossible to keep the animal's trunk away during the marking procedure so this mark was never formally incorporated into the marking test.) The animals were then observed for 10 min. This procedure occurred just after the animals had been hosed and scrubbed down by one of the keepers and was continued for 2 days. After the 2nd day the procedure was discontinued because the animals made no systematic attempts to inspect the marked areas. On the 6th and 7th days, respectively, Ambika and Shanthi were formally tested for self-recognition as described next.
The mirror was positioned in front of the left cage, and both elephants were then moved into the right cage where they both were fed a number of peppermints and menthol cough tablets. The test subject was then immediately wiped on the areas described earlier with the same cloth, but with bright-white zinc-oxide cream substituted for water. Despite the fact that the oxide appeared odorless, the mints and cough tablets were given to help reduce the possibility that the elephants' well-developed sense of smell would contaminate the results. Next, the marked animal was observed for 15 min in the same cage, and all mark-directed responses were recorded. Finally, both subjects were moved into the left cage with the mirror in its usual location outside the enclosure. The marked animal was observed for 15 min, and all behaviors, including mark-directed responses, were recorded as described above.
Additional trials were also run after 10, 14, and 16 days of mirror exposure following the procedure described earlier, except that new colors and marking materials were used to allow different contrasts against the elephants' skin. Slightly different portions of the head were marked, and the size of the marks was enlarged and were sometimes applied as geometrical figures such as crosses and circles.
Experiment 2
Beginning on Day 7, the subjects were tested for their ability to use the mirror to locate and reach for food items that could only be seen with the aid of a mirror. All trials were conducted indoors in one of the two adjacent enclosures. The procedure was to place food rewards (large carrots) in three of five locations (Figure 1 ) just outside one of the enclosures while both elephants were restricted to the other room. The five positions differed in the two enclosures: On the left side the sites were at the level of the public floor in a drainage gutter, whereas on the right side the sites were on the public side of the metal bars at eye level (see Figure 1) . On the right side the restraining bars were set back from the dropoff far enough so that none of the five locations could be seen directly by the elephants except with the aid of a mirror. On the left side the carrots were wedged in a crevice along the main bar so that they were completely invisible from behind, under, and over the bar. The invisibility of all locations was verified by the experimenter as well as one of the keepers, who stood inside the cage, moved as close to the bars as possible, and tried to scan the baited areas. As is apparent from Figure 1 , the elephants were able to extend their heads slightly outside the bars in the center area (and occasionally did so), but their bodies prevented them from positioning their eyes more than a few centimeters beyond the bars. Even from this angle the carrots remained completely invisible.
Next, the sliding door was opened, and the trial began after both elephants had been ushered into the test enclosure by a keeper and the sliding metal door connecting the two enclosures had been closed. Both enclosures were used alternately as restraining and test locations. Unfortunately, the protocol of the zoo (in keeping with the distress responses of the animals) necessitated testing both animals simultaneously.
Three initial trials were conducted to study the general reactions of the elephants to the procedure described earlier and to determine if additional controls would be required to prevent the animals from finding the food through olfactory cues. During the first two of these pretrials (both on Day 7, separated by 45 min), three positions were baited, and the mirror was either not present or angled away. On the third pretrial (Day 8), three of the five locations were again baited, and the mirror was angled in such a way as to make two of the food items visible in the reflection and one not visible. (Angling the mirror in this fashion was sometimes necessary because the visible area in the reflection was so large.) The animals were then moved into the test enclosure.
The trial tests (Days 9-16) were conducted in the same fashion except that the mirror was positioned to reveal two of the three baited positions on every trial. Each trial lasted until all food items had been discovered or 15 min had elapsed. Latency to find each food item was measured with a stopwatch. The mirror was positioned in roughly the same lateral position for the majority of trials to reduce the effects of cuing by the presence of the mirror alone. In addition, data were collected from the same position on these trials as well as during observation sessions during the self-recognition study.
Control trials were run on Days 9, 13, and 15 during which food positions were baited either without the mirror present (Day 9) or with it angled away (Days 13 and 15). Finally, after completion of the trial phase, a transfer test was conducted in which two carrots were placed in novel locations above the animals' heads (see Figure  1 ). The novel positions were not visible in the mirror and had been baited for over 8 hr a day for the previous 2 days (Days 14 and 15). On the test day (Day 16), the mirror was angled upward slightly to reveal their location.
As with Experiment 1, all trials were conducted between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. The animals were moved periodically during this time period for a variety of reasons: cage cleaning, repair, feeding, to give them access to the outdoors, and so forth. The eight trial sessions were conducted at a random time period to minimize the possibility that the elephants would associate a particular event (i.e., cage transfer after cleaning) with the presence of food rewards.
VISUAL EXPLORE MIRROR
Results
Self-Recognition
On first encountering their reflections, both animals showed a considerable interest in the mirror. Their initial reactions included a series of trunk raises, a behavior observed in the wild both to threaten others and to sniff the air for other elephants (Sikes, 1971) . Both animals also monitored the mirror intently. This monitoring behavior primarily took two forms. The first was an intense visual exploration of the mirror in which the head of the elephant was swung from side to side, which allowed both eyes to scan the mirror in rapid succession. The second behavior was the animal's positioning itself in front of the mirror and orienting itself so that one eye could monitor the mirror. The gaze of the animal was judged as carefully as possible by the observer. Figures 2 and 3 provide the data on these behaviors for the two animals over the course of the experiment. The frequency of visual exploration of the mirror was high for both animals but quickly dropped off to low levels ( Figure 2 ). The pattern of responses for the category Monitor Mirror differed for the 2 subjects. Ambika showed relatively consistent, high frequencies across the entire test period, whereas Shanthi's responses were more erratic (Figure 3) .
Although the overall time spent exploring the mirror declined over a relatively short period, this behavior was not displaced by any other behaviors in front of the mirror that might be described as self-directed. The animals were carefully observed for any signs that they were using the mirror to gain otherwise unavailable information about themselves, such as use of their trunks to explore behind their ears, attempts to look into their mouths, or attempts to use the reflection to locate and remove straw or other debris from their heads (for comparable behavior with self-recognizing apes, see Gallup, 1975; Lethmate & Ducker, 1973) . However even after two weeks of continuous exposure, no self-directed behaviors emerged.
Evidence from the mark tests are consistent with the observations described earlier. The results of the first 2 days of the sham marking procedure are given in Table 1 . The animals gave little indication that they were at all affected by the procedure, probably because they were still wet from their morning bath and were accustomed to being handled in such a fashion. The two mark-directed movements that Ambika displayed occurred toward the end of the 10 min and appeared to be isolated movements, not systematic investigations of the areas. The primary data for the actual mark tests are provided in Table 2 . Five of the seven tests elicited practically no reactions from the subjects during either the control or test sessions, despite the fact that on all trials the animals were observed to visually explore or monitor the mirror. (In fact, on Day 16 Shanthi was led in front of the mirror by one of the keepers after the trial session, and her attention was drawn to the mirror and the marks by pointing, but she still failed to show any mark-directed behavior.) The tests run on Day 10 appear to provide evidence for self-recognition by Shanthi. However, these mark-directed responses began immediately as she was entering the test enclosure, and from that deep in the enclosure, it was definitely impossible for her to have seen any part of herself in the mirror. Thus it had to be concluded that the marks were discovered by olfactory or tactile cues. Ambika's responses on this same day support this view (Table 2) . (A different marking substance, yellow and red finger paint, that had a slight odor had been used on this trial. On later trials the elephants were first marked behind their ears with this substance and were encouraged to smell it to dampen their sensitivity to the odor.) During Ambika's first mark test, Shanthi was restrained about 5 m away from her by one of the keepers. Immediately after being released, Shanthi turned her head toward Ambika and moved closer to visually inspect the marked areas with her trunk. Next, she raised her trunk and carefully touched the marked area on Ambika's head. She was quickly restrained by the keepers and held at a distance until the control session was over. Even during the test session, Shanthi showed an intense visual interest in the marks that had been applied to Ambika and occasionally touched them. Despite this potential cuing Ambika made no attempts to touch the marked areas, even while both were in front of the mirror.
Mirror Use to Discover Hidden Food
From their first trial with the experimental design shown in Figure 1 , the elephants demonstrated an ability to use the mirror to discover otherwise invisible food items. Because the elephants often dangled their trunks into the drainage gutter along the outside floor of their left enclosure, a control test was conducted prior to the trial phase to determine if the elephants would discover the food items by chance or through olfactory cues. As can be seen from Table 3 , neither of the subjects discovered any of the three hidden carrots during the two sessions when the mirror was angled away or not present, but when the mirror was positioned in its usual location Ambika quickly oriented toward it and located the food reward. These pretrial tests took place only in the left enclosure, primarily because the elephants were never observed using their trunks to explore the crevices in the horizontal metal bar just outside the right cage.
Given this level of performance on Trial 1, training procedures were deemed unnecessary and both animals were tested together on eight 1 unique trials (Table 4) . A clear pattern is present. The first food item located and obtained during each session was always one of the two that was visible in the mirror. This result was significantly greater than chance (p < .05). Both subjects used the mirror to locate the hidden food, with Ambika finding the first item slightly more often (« = 5) than Shanthi (n -3). This corresponds well with the data presented in Figure 3 , which shows that by one behavioral measure Ambika's attention to the mirror lasted considerably longer than Shanthi's. Thus, this distribution is more or less what one may expect on the basis of the amount of time each subject spent monitoring the mirror.
A statistical analysis of the second and third items found is not possible because all three items were found only on four of the eight trials. This should not be surprising because the animals had not been previously trained to know either the position or the number of baited locations. It must be kept in mind that when the trial sessions began, there were a total of 10 possible locations for hidden food. Only one of these had been previously associated with a food reward (discovered by Ambika during the pretrial test). In fact, an examination of Table 4 suggests that the animals learned during the course of the experiment that more than one item was hidden.
However, the latencies to find the first items (coupled with the fact that the animals did not immediately approach the front of the cage and begin searching) strongly support the suggestion that even by end of the experiment the elephants were unable to predict the onset of a trial (see Discussion). Instead, it appeared that once one of the animals scanned the mirror closely enough to discover a hidden carrot, they both realized that more food items might be present and adopted a variety of strategies to obtain them (i.e., sweeping along the floor away from the other subject, scanning the mirror again, and attempting to prevent the other animal from having access to the front of the cage). By the fourth or fifth trial, it became apparent that the second food item discovered was not a reliable indicator of mirror-mediated behavior. Therefore, the critical data were the latencies to find the first carrot and whether or not it was visible in the reflection.
In five of the eight trials more than one food item was found (Trials 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8). Three of the second items found were visible in the mirror, and two were not. This finding is consistent with the observation that as the trials proceeded, the mirror was initially used by one of the animals to locate the first food item, but after that, competition between the two animals made the mirror cues less relevant. Often (especially Trials 4, 6, 7, and 8), both animals began to sweep along the floor or railing to discover the other hidden food items (perhaps relying more on olfactory and tactile cues) once the first item had been found.
Control trials were conducted 20 min before Trial 1 and 20 and 30 min after Trials 5 and 7, respectively. The mirror was either angled away or not present (Table 5 ). In contrast to the trial sessions, on two of the three control tests no food items were found within the 15-min criterion, despite occasional trunk dangles, sometimes within inches of the hidden food. Note. Trials 1, 3, 6, and 7 were in the left enclosure, and Trials 2, 4, 5, and 8 were in the right. Eight of eight food items that were found first were visible; no food item that was invisible was found first. Position = location in which food item was hidden; Latency = latency to find first food item; Subject = subject who found first food item; I = not visible in mirror; and V = visible in mirror. The animals' performance was significantly greater than chance, x 2 U, N = 8) = 4.07, p < .05. a First food item found.
b Second food item found. c Third food item found.
However, none of these behaviors (except on Day 13) appeared to be searching behaviors. They more closely resembled the original trunk dangling behavior observed before the beginning of the experiment (see above). This is also evidenced by the fact that during the control trials the animals did not turn, crouch, and orient their head so that one eye could scan the mirror as they did during the trial sessions. On Day 13, one of the food items was discovered by Shanthi after over 10 min of multiple, short bouts of dangling her trunk down to the floor. It should be emphasized that this was not associated with the behaviors witnessed on the trial sessions such as forward visual exploration, orientation of eye toward the front of enclosure, and crouching.
On Days 15 and 16, two additional, novel locations that had never been associated with food and that were not visible in the mirror were baited with carrots. These rewards were located in an area well above and in front of the animals' heads (see Figure 1 ) that was rarely explored by the elephants with their trunks. These carrots were left in place for over 8 hr on each day, but despite this they were not found by either subject (Table 6 ). On the day immediately following the last test trial, the same two positions were baited again, and the front of the mirror stand was elevated about 25 cm in order to bring the baited positions into view. The animals were then let into the cage, and both spent the first 8 min in the extreme rear of the cage away from the mirror. Shanthi then advanced to the front of the cage, oriented her eye to the mirror and reached directly to the baited location on the upper right side of the left enclosure and obtained the food reward. The second food item was found 3 min, 20 s later by Ambika, who oriented toward the mirror in a similar fashion before reaching immediately and directly to the remaining baited position.
Discussion
After 2 weeks of exposure to a mirror that provided a clear view of most of their body, little evidence emerged that Asian elephants are capable of self-recognition. This finding is consistent with a previous preliminary investigation of mine (with A. Young) conducted with another female Asian elephant (Emily) housed at the Buttonwood Zoo in Buttonwood, Massachusetts. Emily was not formally tested with a marking procedure, but even after repeated opportunities to examine the mirror with her trunk, she did not show any self-directed behaviors. In fact, she continued to look and reach behind the mirror, as if searching for another elephant. This pattern persisted even after a week and a half of access to the mirror. Chimpanzees cease this behavior after 2 or 3 days, whereas monkeys may occasionally show this behavior for an indefinite period of time (Anderson, 1984) . The results of this study offer no support for Gallup's (1982 Gallup's ( , 1985 model of the emergence of mind. On the other hand, it may be premature to construe these results as contradicting the model because at present there is no definitive evidence that elephants are capable of using their own experiences to guess what the experiences of others are like. However, if rigorous experimental studies (e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978) demonstrate that elephants are capable of the attribution of intent, for example, then their inability to recognize themselves will cast serious doubt on the generality of the model.
Another explanation of the data reported here is that elephant vision is too poor for a visual test of self-recognition to be successful. However, despite anecdotal reports that elephants have poor visual acuity, this does not appear to be a valid explanation of the present results. First, experimental evidence has shown that out of direct sunlight, elephants see quite well. Rensch's (1957) classic work with elephants required the discrimination of fairly small, complex geometric figures at distances only slightly closer than the mirror was to the subjects in the present study. Second, all of the subjects initially responded to their reflections with species-typical gestures (i.e., trunk raises), which indicates that they were responding to the image of another elephant. Third, their ability to discover the hidden food demonstrated an impressive visual ability because the carrots were often difficult for the human observers to locate while looking in the mirror to check on their visibility and invisibility. Finally, the most convincing evidence for both an ability to see the marks and a motivation to inspect them came from Shanthi's inspection of Ambika's marks on the first mark test because she was further away from her than they were from the mirror during the test sessions. (Additional inspections of the subject's marked areas by the other animal were witnessed on a number of other occasions as well.)
Although the elephants showed no signs of self-recognition, both appeared to develop a sophisticated ability to interpret mirrored information during the course of their exposure to Latency to find not found not found 552s Note. In both control trials and in the test trial, two positions were baited; for control trials the food items were left in position for over 8 hr per trial. the mirror. The primary results (Table 4 ) support the idea that the subjects used the mirror as a source of information concerning the location of food items that could not be seen directly. The performances by the elephants on the pretrial and control tests (Tables 3 and 5 ) argue against the possibility that the animals were using olfactory cues initially to localize the position of the rewards.
One potential objection to this interpretation is that the presence of the observer or the mirror itself may have served as a cue that allowed the animals to know when food would be present. This seems implausible for a variety of reasons. First, as was noted, the mirror was placed in only one location in front of each cage and was present throughout the morning regardless of whether food had been hidden. The eight trial sessions were haphazardly interspersed around the multiple cage transfers (see Method) that occurred during the mornings. Yet an analysis of the timing of the trial sessions shows that they varied across the 2-hr period and did not consistently follow or precede events such as cleaning or feeding. For example, it so happened that because the animals were moved between cages for cleaning, Trials 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 were conducted sometime after they were moved for the first time (but before cage cleaning occurred), and Trials 1, 4, and 6 were conducted only after the elephants had been moved back into the cage that had just been cleaned. This daily change in routine, combined with the small number of trials relative to cage transfers, and the presence of the experimenter throughout the morning (in the same position) when trials were not taking place, seems to preclude a strong association between certain external events and the presence of carrots.
Second, the results of the transfer test (Table 6 ) are difficult to explain unless the animals understood the correspondence between the reflection in the mirror and the location of the objects in real space. These carrots were in place for over 8 hr for 2 days and were not found by the elephants, despite potential cues by the observer, the keepers, and the public who could see them. Also, given that the animals usually did not move to the front of the cage and immediately begin searching, it appears that they were unable to predict which cage transfers were associated with hidden food, even after eight trials. In addition, as was noted, the elephants did not know in advance where to search for food, and despite the fact that their only experience during the pretrials had been on the floor outside the left cage, they performed correctly on Trial 1 when tested in the right cage in what were at that point novel locations (crevices in the horizontal bar). Finally, even if the animals did anticipate the beginning of a trial, the first carrot located was always one that was visible in the mirror, which indicates that the mirror provided critical information used in locating the first food item.
The nature of the process underlying the mirror-mediated discovery of food is less certain, however. In fact, it is quite possible that multiple processes may be at work. To some extent this has been recognized by both Menzel et al. (1985) and Anderson (1986) . However, because all of the paradigms used thus far to study mirror-mediated reaching behavior have been quite similar, it now seems possible to outline a simple hierarchy of processes, ordered from more to less complex, that may be involved when an organism uses mirrored cues to discover otherwise invisible food rewards.
The most parsimonious interpretation of such behavior is what may be called mirror-triggered searching behavior. Once an organism has been trained to retrieve hidden food items in a few fixed locations in the presence of a mirror, the mirror may simply serve to trigger searching behavior in the location or locations that have been baited in the past. In other words, the reflected image of a food reward may be associated with previous experiences with finding food in certain locations. The subject may not necessarily possess either an understanding of the duality of the mirror-image and the environment or an ability to locate novel placements of food items. Menzel et al. (1985) described this type of performance by rhesus monkeys, and all but 2 of Anderson's (1986) macaque subjects were apparently limited to similar behaviors.
The next level of complexity can be referred to as mirrormediated spatial location of objects. Here an organism must demonstrate its ability to locate directly food objects when novel placements are used. This differs from mirror-triggered searching behavior in that the animal is required to understand the correspondence between the object's relative position in a mirror and the real world counterpart to the position. To demonstrate this level of sophistication, an animal needs to understand the duality implicit for objects in the mirror and the environment. It does not, however, necessitate that an animal understand the duality between its own reaching hand or trunk and the image of that hand or trunk in the mirror. Instead, it may be using other cues in the environment to locate the approximate location of the item and then, once close enough, olfactory or proprioceptive factors can take over control of the searching behavior.
Finally, the most complicated form of mirror-mediated object location can be termed mirror-guided reaching (Anderson, 1986; Menzel et al., 1985) . Under these conditions an animal capable of self-recognition ought to be able to understand the correspondence between its own efforts and the image depicting those efforts in the mirror. Finely detailed movements, corresponding to moment-to-moment adjustments of reaching behavior, ought to be observed as the animal searches for the hidden food. In nonhumans this type of behavior has so far only been exhibited by chimpanzees (Menzel et al., 1985) . It is also possible that animals incapable of self-recognition may display such behavior after extensive training (e.g., Itakura, 1987) in which the subject essentially learns to form an association between its own efforts and the other hand in the mirror-without ever grasping the duality involved.
By themselves, the data reported in Table 4 cannot support more than the claim that Asian elephants possess a capacity for mirror-mediated spatial location of objects. For example, on one occasion (Trial 2; see Table 4 for the positions of the food rewards), each of the animals was standing in front of a baited, visible position, but because of the location of the mirror and the obstruction of the other elephant, they could see the carrot in front of the other animal, but not the one directly in front of themselves. Ambika visually scanned the mirror and then moved from her end of the enclosure and nudged up from behind Shanthi and reached directly for the food that had been visible from the other side of the enclosure. Next, Shanthi visually oriented toward the mirror and then moved to Ambika's former location and obtained the carrot that had been visible in the reflection from her original location. Thus, the animals appeared to understand the leftright reversal property of mirrors and were able to use the mirror to locate objects in space, but they may or may not have been using the mirror to help guide their reaching efforts (Anderson, 1986; Menzel et al., 1985) . However, it does appear possible to rule out the hypothesis that the elephants were engaging in mirror-triggered reaching behavior. Because the subjects were not trained to search in the 10 locations before the trial session began, they had no way of knowing where to find hidden food objects until well into experiment. Also, as was noted on their first trial in the right cage, the animals did not search the floor but responded by accurate reaches along the rail. In addition, they discovered the food on the novel trial in an area entirely removed from the locations of previously successful searches.
Other observations were consistent with the possibility that the elephants were not only capable of a sophisticated form of mirror-mediated object location but perhaps even mirrorguided reaching behavior. On the majority of the trials, the elephants appeared to correct their reaching efforts on the basis of mirrored information. For example, on Trial 4 (Table  4) , Ambika discovered the first food item, but her initial reach missed the carrot by about % m. She attempted to compensate by moving her trunk slightly to the right, but this took it further away from the baited location. She immediately stopped the move in the wrong direction and slowly brought her trunk back toward the correct location. However, because of the narrowness of the bars and a water trough that limited her reaching length, she withdrew her trunk and reached around the trough directly to the location of the reward. It is worth noting that during this and all other initial locations of food items, the subject had her head lowered and turned to the side with an exaggeratedly open eye oriented toward the mirror.
The observations described earlier stand in contrast to the findings of Menzel et al. (1985) , who witnessed no evidence that their rhesus monkeys "monitored, and adjusted, the moment-to-moment positions of their hands relative to that of the target, solely by visual information from the mirror" (p. 215). Likewise, Anderson (1986) did not describe this type of behavior by either of his 2 macaques that eventually learned to use mirrored cues for locating otherwise invisible food rewards. Both elephants in this study appeared to monitor carefully their reaching efforts in the mirror and seemed to be using that information to make fine adjustments if they accidentally began reaching in the wrong direction. In the future the reaching efforts will be recorded on videotape to allow for a more fine-grained analysis to be performed such as those done with chimpanzees (Menzel et al., 1985) . However, additional controls will be necessary to rule out the possibility that olfactory cues may guide the elephant's reaching behavior at extremely close range after the subject has used the mirror to localize the hidden food.
Recently, Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, SavageRumbaugh, and Hopkins (1989) have demonstrated that rhesus monkeys are capable of using joysticks to guide a cursor to a moving target on a video monitor. They argued that because the subject's hand on the joystick is spatially displaced from the monitor where its actions are having their This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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effect and because the cursor must be guided to reach a moving target, such video tasks are even more abstract than mirror-guided reaching. They further speculated that monkeys trained on such video tasks may be expected to successfully pass Gallup's mark tests because they now possess all of the cognitive equipment necessary for such behavior. At present this remains an open question, but similar previous reasoning involving tool-using monkeys (Bayart & Anderson, 1985) and monkeys trained to perform mirror-guided reaching (Itakura, 1987) have not produced monkeys capable of self-recognition. Likewise, the results presented here do not support the hypothesis that self-recognition is but an epiphenomenon of complex visually directed or spatially dislocated monitoring abilities.
Conclusion
Despite over 2 weeks of nearly continuous access to mirrors, neither elephant gave any indication of self-recognition; they did not display any self-directed responses in which they appeared to be using the mirror to gain otherwise inaccessible information about themselves, and they failed a formal test of self-recognition. Therefore, the findings reported in this study, combined with the results of Anderson (1986) and Itakura (1987) , cast doubt upon Menzel et al.'s (1985) hypothesis that the failure to find self-recognition in most animals is due to an inability to process information related to spatially displaced reaching efforts. To the contrary, my results show that some species that fail currently defined tests of selfrecognition can quickly learn to adjust to spatially displaced information about their own behavior. Menzel et al.'s (1985) argument appears problematic from another viewpoint as well. One of the important control procedures in the more recent self-recognition tests has been to mark a spot on the subjects that they can see directly (such as their stomachs or wrists), as well as marks that are only visible with reference to a mirror. All species that have been tested with this control procedure, including those that do not respond to the marks on their foreheads and ears, have shown an intense interest in the marks that are directly visible (for example, Gallup et al., 1980) . Thus, even if monkeys and lesser apes were unable to guide their hands to a surreptitiously applied mark on their heads by using mirrored cues, they would still be expected to be motivated to touch the mark if they knew that the image in the mirror was themselves. They never do. Gallup (1975) appears to have been correct in asserting that the differences between monkeys (at least those species tested thus far) and chimpanzees "may be more cognitive than mechanistic" (p. 329).
Because the 2 subjects in this study were able to locate food rewards in novel locations and perhaps were able to guide their reaching efforts with the aid of the mirror, it may be argued that this behavior can be interpreted as a form of selfrecognition. This interpretation seems to be denied by an additional finding obtained at the end of the elephants' 2-week exposure to the mirror. A pile of carrots was placed directly in front of the mirror where the animals could see it directly and in the reflection. Unlike the elephants' behavior toward a pile of carrots placed in the same location without the mirror, they refused to take the food for almost a full minute, making a number of hesitant reaches toward the pile but always pulling back. Even when they finally did take the carrots, they used a species-typical hoarding behavior in which they scooped the carrots away from the mirror. (This behavior was a common method used by both animals to steal preferred food items from each other while they were fed.) Thus, it appeared that the elephants were still treating the image of their trunks as another conspecific. Likewise, Menzel et al. (1985) reported that rhesus monkeys that had been habituated to mirrors recommenced threat displays as their hands reached toward food in a procedure similar to the one described here. Chimpanzees, on the other hand, apparently show no such behavior.
Thus, despite their complicated uses of mirrored information, it is erroneous to conclude from the data presented here that elephants are capable of self-recognition. Instead, this work supports the view that repeated failures to find selfrecognition in monkeys and many other animals is not because they lack the mechanistic skills for visually displaced reaching behavior.
